Introduction

compensation (hereafter SOP Bill).
5 On the same day, then-Senator Barack Obama introduced a companion bill in the Senate (S.1181).
But it was the financial crisis of [2007] [2008] to accelerate the path toward mandatory adoption of SOP. Growing income inequality, public outrage over Wall Street excesses (e.g. the large bonuses paid at AIG) and banks' bailouts, and the perception that executive pay played a role in inducing excessive risk-taking pressured policy-makers to take action with respect to executive pay. Many of the legislative proposals discussed in the House and Senate in 2008 and 2009 contained a SOP provision (see Table 1 in Larcker, Ormazabal and Taylor 2011). Also, holding a SOP vote was a mandatory condition for firms to receive funds under the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP). During the 2008 campaign, both Presidential candidates
expressed support for SOP. As these events unfolded, the debate on merits and drawbacks of SOP heated up. Critics of SOP argued that, at best, SOP votes would be ignored (because nonbinding) and, at worst, would cause directors to pander to shareholders with special interests or lacking the required expertise and sophistication, ultimately resulting in the adoption of suboptimal pay practices (Kaplan 2007; Bainbridge 2008) . 6 They also cautioned that the high 5 House Bill 1257: Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act.
6 Analytical studies have also raised questions on the informativeness of SOP votes. Ozbas and Matsusaka (2013) note that SOP votes only reveal shareholder preferences for the current compensation plan compared to the alternative plan that will be adopted if the current plan is rejected, but such alternative plan is unclear in practice, casting doubts on whether the shareholder votes on SOP may be truly informative. Levit and Malenko (2011) 
II. The Effect of Say on Pay on Executive Compensation
A. Effect of SOP votes on level and composition of executive pay
As discussed earlier, United Kingdom was the first country to adopt SOP in 2002 for publicly traded firms. Ferri and Maber (2013) report that in most cases shareholders voted in favor of compensation plans. Failed SOP votes (i.e. greater than 50% of votes against) were rare (2% of the sample), though highly publicized in the press. However, about one-fourth of the sample firms received more than 20% of votes against.
To capture the overall effect of SOP on CEO pay, Ferri and Maber (2013) a sub-market of the London Stock Exchange with a more flexible regulatory system), suggesting that the result reflects the impact of SOP rather than a general trend affecting all firms. Besides, Ferri and Maber (2013) find that the increase is more pronounced in firms experiencing high voting dissent and firms with high abnormal CEO pay before the adoption of SOP, consistent with a causal impact of SOP. In contrast, they fail to find any effect of SOP on the level of pay. Correa and Lel (2013) examine the effect of SOP laws on CEO pay using a large cross-country sample of about 103,000 firm-year observations from 39 countries, including 12 countries that adopted some (advisory or binding) version of SOP. They essentially compare post-SOP CEO pay at firms of countries adopting SOP to a control sample which includes all non-SOP observations (that is, pre-SOP CEO pay in countries eventually adopting SOP as well as CEO pay in countries never adopting SOP). They find that firms in a post-SOP regime: (i) exhibit lower CEO pay levels (but only in countries adopting an advisory SOP vote), a finding driven by a relative decline in equity awards and limited to CEOs and not the other top executives; (ii) higher pay-performance sensitivity (the authors do not look at positive and negative performance separately). The current version of the paper does not examine whether these findings are more pronounced in (or driven by) firms with excess CEO pay before the adoption of SOP and in firms experiencing adverse SOP votes.
The drawback of the research design in Correa and Lel (2013) is that it is not clear whether the results reflect time-series changes within countries adopting SOP (pre vs. post) or difference between firms in SOP and non-SOP countries. For example, further tests in the paper suggest not be surprising. More generally, the findings cannot be necessarily generalized to firms away from the 50% threshold or to firms not targeted by SOP shareholder proposals.
B. Effect of SOP votes on compensation practices
Analyses of the effect of SOP on level and composition of CEO pay may not capture a number of other changes to compensation contracts that may be induced by SOP votes but are not reflected in measure of CEO pay. For example, the introduction of performance-based vesting provisions is typically not reflected in the estimates of fair value of equity grants used by researchers in measuring CEO pay. Many other changes (e.g. terms of severance packages) will only be reflected in measures of CEO pay contingent upon the occurrence of certain events.
Hence, it is important to complement the evidence in section II.A with an analysis of firms' disclosures of changes to observable provisions of compensation contracts. Another benefit of this approach is that it captures the changes that boards explicitly present as a response to SOP votes, and thus, it acts as a reality check on regression-based inferences. For example, a regression-based finding of, say, a decrease in CEO pay level would be more credible if supported by evidence that firms disclose a decision to reduce target levels of CEO pay in response to an adverse SOP vote (an action that presumably they have an incentive to disclose to get rewarded by shareholders in subsequent votes).
Two studies collect data on specific changes made to compensation contracts explicitly in response to SOP votes in the UK and the US, using firms' disclosures in their proxy statements.
Ferri and Maber (2013) examine the compensation reports of a sample of UK firms before and after the first SOP vote and find that firms experiencing higher voting dissent were significantly more likely to remove compensation provisions criticized by investors as 'rewards for failure'
relative to a matched sample of firms experiencing lower dissent. For example, they report that among firms with long notice periods (implying larger severance payments ) the percentage of high dissent firms that shortened them after the vote (80.0%) was significantly higher than before the vote (20.0%) and also significantly higher than among low dissent firms after the vote (33.3%). They report similar findings for another controversial practice, namely, the presence of In their cross-country study Correa and Lel (2013) also examine the effect of SOP laws on Tobin's Q and report a 3.6% increase in firm value following the adoption of the SOP laws (more precisely, a 3.6% higher firm value for post-SOP observations relative to a control sample that pools together pre-SOP and non-SOP observations). They acknowledge that this increase in firm value is too large to be justified by the relative decrease in CEO pay that they document and suggest (but do not test) that it may reflect better alignment of pay and performance. 13 A key concern is that higher valuation in countries with SOP laws may reflect other governance changes introduced at the same time. While the study controls for other compensation-related laws, there may be other non-compensation regulations introduced with SOP and with a potentially larger impact on firm value.
IV. What have we learned?
Adoption of SOP in the US has been long advocated by those who contend that executive pay is a manifestation of, rather than a solution to, the agency problem and by those who favor great shareholder involvement in corporate decisions. A growing body of research is starting to investigate the effect of SOP on executive pay and firm value. It is premature to draw definitive conclusions, also because these studies differ in methodologies and settings, but three points seem to emerge. First, there is robust evidence that boards respond to SOP votes: when 13 They also find that the firm value increase is higher when the relative decrease in CEO pay results in a lower pay differential between CEO and other top managers (CEO pay slice) implying that a source of value creation may be the reduced pay inequality among the top management team. But this seems unlikely to explain the change in Tobin's Q, since the increase occurs for both firms with advisory SOP laws and firms with binding SOP laws and there is no change in CEO pay slice in firms subject to binding SOP laws.
shareholders use it, "voice" is heard". Both in the US and UK studies show that not only firms failing to win the SOP vote, but also firms facing substantial dissent ( findings (e.g. they fail to find an effect on CEO pay or the effect is too small to justify the documented price impact, hence it remains unclear what the source of value creation is). Also, there seems to be no stock price reaction to the SOP-induced compensation changes. Finally, given the nature of these SOP-induced changes, while some of them may be beneficial, it seems hard to believe that they will have a statistically detectable impact on firm value, except perhaps in a handful of firms where the compensation plan is subject to a complete overhaul.
Perhaps one explanation for the weak impact of SOP is that executive pay problems were overstated, or that, by the time SOP was introduced (more than a decade after the Enron-type scandals that led to calls for greater shareholder voice), they had been already addressed via other mechanisms (hedge fund activism, monitoring by institutional investors, vote-no campaigns against compensation committee members, SEC-mandated pay disclosures).
Overall, though, based on the evidence to date, it does not appear that SOP had a major impact.
14 Was the adoption of SOP an 'optimal' choice from a social welfare point of view? This is a difficult question to answer given the challenges of identifying and measuring all the potential costs and benefits associated with SOP (likely to change over time and differ across countries).
Perhaps the most positive view of SOP is that its introduction prevented the adoption of other more radical and intrusive regulatory measures (e.g. CEO pay caps). In that sense, it may be viewed as an 'optimal' answer (i.e. the lesser of two evils) to the political pressure to reform executive pay during the financial crisis.
14 This interpretation of the evidence is also consistent with the prediction of analytical studies. Ozbas and Matsusaka (2013) model the benefits and costs of shareholder empowerment distinguishing between the right to approve and the right to propose. They show that permitting shareholders to propose directors or policies can cause value-maximizing managers to take value-reducing actions to accommodate activist investors with non-valuemaximizing goals. As for the right to approve, it is weakly beneficial: that is, approval rights (such as a SOP vote) are generally beneficial for shareholders in that they limit the manager's ability to pursue private benefits at shareholder expense; but they have minimal impact on managerial actions and firm value (because the manager in effect can threaten shareholders with an undesirable status quo if they do not approve the manager's proposed action).
